Beschreibung
The theoretical motivation behind the proposal and preparation of this work was the difficulty visualised among jurists, commentators and opinion formers. For the most part, jurists linked to the field of business law find it difficult to admit the effective action of depersonalised companies, with the unfortunate consequence of denying them the rights recognised by regular or personalised companies. One of the theoretical possibilities for answering the question would be to simply admit the existence of a logical contradiction, since in principle it doesn't make sense to admit something defined as depersonalised as a person. In fact, many dispute the legal personality of these entities on the grounds that they lack procedural capacity. Against this, under other strong arguments, it has been shown that these entities have procedural capacity, are subjects of rights, since they are capable of contracting rights and obligations and, in view of the evolution of legal thought, personality exists far beyond the wall of the company registry.
