Institutions, Equilibria and Efficiency

InhaltsangabeBirgit Grodal: A Friend to Her Friends.- On the Definition of Differentiated Products in the Real World.- Equilibrium Pricing of Derivative Securities in Dynamically Incomplete Markets.- Adaptive Contracting: The Trial-and-Error Approach to Outsourcing.- Monetary Equilibria over an Infinite Horizon.- Do the Wealthy Risk More Money? An Experimental Comparison.- Are Incomplete Markets Able to Achieve Minimal Efficiency?.- A Competitive Model of Economic Geography.- The Organization of Production, Consumption and Learning.- Household Inefficiency and Equilibrium Efficiency.- Equilibrium with Arbitrary Market Structure.- Pareto Improving Price Regulation when the Asset Market is Incomplete.- On Behavioral Heterogeneity.- Learning of Steady States in Nonlinear Models when Shocks Follow a Markov Chain.- The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information.- Group Formation with Heterogeneous Feasible Sets.- Monotone Risk Aversion.- Will Democracy Engender Equality?.- Consumption Externalities, Rental Markets and Purchase Clubs.- Core-Equivalence for the Nash Bargaining Solution.

InhaltsangabeBirgit Grodal: A Friend to Her Friends.- On the Definition of Differentiated Products in the Real World.- Equilibrium Pricing of Derivative Securities in Dynamically Incomplete Markets.- Adaptive Contracting: The Trial-and-Error Approach to Outsourcing.- Monetary Equilibria over an Infinite Horizon.- Do the Wealthy Risk More Money? An Experimental Comparison.- Are Incomplete Markets Able to Achieve Minimal Efficiency?.- A Competitive Model of Economic Geography.- The Organization of Production, Consumption and Learning.- Household Inefficiency and Equilibrium Efficiency.- Equilibrium with Arbitrary Market Structure.- Pareto Improving Price Regulation when the Asset Market is Incomplete.- On Behavioral Heterogeneity.- Learning of Steady States in Nonlinear Models when Shocks Follow a Markov Chain.- The Evolution of Conventions under Incomplete Information.- Group Formation with Heterogeneous Feasible Sets.- Monotone Risk Aversion.- Will Democracy Engender Equality?.- Consumption Externalities, Rental Markets and Purchase Clubs.- Core-Equivalence for the Nash Bargaining Solution.